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ThePrivate Enforcement of Law
William M. Landes* and Richard A. Posner**
Economists have begun to turn their attention to the process by
which law is enforced, as well as the substance of legal rules. 3_I An
important question in the economic study of enforcement is the appropriate,
and the actual, division of responsibilities between public and private
enforcers. This question has been brought into sharp focus recently by
anarticle in which Gary Becker and George Stigler advocate the privatiza-.
tion of law enforcement. f-" Under their proposal, private individuals
and firms would investigate violations, apprehend violators (including
criminaloffenders), and conduct legal proceedings to redress violations,
including criminal prosecutions. A private enforcer would be entitled,
if successful, to retain the entire proceeds of the suit--for example,
the fine paid by the convicted offender. The unsuccessful enforcer would
be required to reimburse the defendant's legal expenses.
Although Becker and Stigler's proposal may seem at first glance
revolutionary and wholly unrealistic, on reflection it is evident that
private enforcement is a pervasive feature of the existing social and economic
system. In the enforcement of contract, tort, and property law, for example,
the role of the state is limited essentially to furnishing a court system;
indeed most contracts, both formal and informal, are "enforced" simply by
the latent threat of withdrawing future business from the violator.
p2..
Employersdiscourage employee corruption and malfeasance by dismissing
an employee if his hlviolationH is detected, Until recently, bounties
for dangerous or destructive animals werecommon, and the bounty systems
had the essential features of the private enforcementsystem that Becker
and Stigler propose. Many laws, notably the antitrust laws, are
enforced by private as well as public entities;as we shall see, the
contemporary antitrust class action has the essential features of the
Becker-Stigler proposal. The use of paid informers by policedepartments,
the Internal Revenue Service, and other public enforcementagencies is an
example of private enforcement, here supplementary to public. Blackmail
is another, if unconventiona', example of theprivate enforcement of law--
the blackmailer induces his victim, the violator ofa legal or moral rule,
to pay him a sum up to the amount that the violator would bewilling to
pay to avoid punishment. In effect punishment is imposed, but it is paid
to the private enforcer who has discovered the violation.Bribery is very
similar.
For many centuries, indeed, the enforcement of the criminal and
regulatory laws of England (and doubtless of other countries as well)
followed the pattern suggested by Becker and Stigler. Parliamentand
municipal authorities (as well as private firms and individuals) paid
bountiesfor the apprehension and conviction of offenders,, and in the
case of offenses punished by fines, the fine was divided between the Crown
andthe enforcer. There were no public prosecutors, and thepolice were
public in name only. This system of private enforcement was progressively
abandoned during the nineteenth century, although traces of itpersist to
this day. Similarly in modern America private enforcement ismuch less3.
extensive than Becker and Stigler contend would be efficient. This
alleged discrepancy between the optimal and the actual is at least
puzzling, in the light of recent findings that considerations of efficiency
have played an important role in shaping the structure of the legal system
and the behavior of its participants. The alternative possibility
explored in the present article is that the area in which private enforce-
ment is in fact clearly preferable to public enforcement on efficiency
grounds is more restricted than Becker and Stigler believe; perhaps the
existing division of enforcement between the public and private sectors
approximates the optimal division.
PartI develops an economic model of competitive, profit-maximizing
private enforcement. The model predicts the level of enforcement and the
number of offenses that would occur in a world of exclusively private
enforcement.W Part II refines the model to account for the presence of
monopoly in the private enforcement industry, different assignments of
property rights in legal claims, the effect of taxing private enforcers,
nonmonetarypenalties, and legal errors--elements ignored in the initial
development of the model in Part I.Part III contrasts our model with other
economic approaches to the enforcement question. Part IV presents a nunter
of positive implications of the model, relating to the choice between public
and private enforcement of criminal versus civil laws, the assignment of
exclusive rights to the victims of offenses, the budgets of public agencies,
the discretionary nonenforcement of the law, and the legal treatment of
blackmail and bribery. The positive implications of the model appear to be
consistent with observations of the real world, although the findings in
p4.
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PartIV must be regarded as highly tentative. Anappendix discusses the
economics of rewards--an important method of comDensatinqprivate enforcers.
I. A MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
A. The Equilibrium Conditions of the PrivateEnforcement Industry
We define the output of the enforcement industryas the apprehension
and Conviction of offenders. Offenders includenot only criminal offenders
but also persons who commit torts, breakcontracts, violate the antitrust
laws, etc. but for simplicity we limit the formalpresentation to a single
type of criminal offense where a unit of output requires both theapprehen-
sion and conviction of the offender. The output (A) is produced using
two inputs: an aggregate of hired resources (R) availableat a constant
per-unit price of r, and an input of criminal offenses (0). The enforcement
production function is
A =A(R,O), (1)
where increases in both R and 0 increase the industry'soutput (i.e.,
the marginal products of R and 0 are assumed to bepositive). "Ais
"sold" to the state for a price equal to the finepaid by the convicted
offender. (Later we consider situations in which the offender'spenalty
differs from the enforcer's return, for example where theoffender is
imprisoned and the enforcer receives a bounty from the state.) Since
offenders are a source of potential income, thequestion arises as to the
ownership of this asset. We assume initially the ownership scheme implied
by the Becker—Stigler analysis: the first enforcer toapprehend and convict
the offender is entitled to receive the fine. In Part II we shall modify
this assumption and analyze the effects of enforcementon alternative
property—right assignments, such as victim rights or state ownership.
To simplify the analysis still further, weassume an industry constant—5.
p
returns—to—scaleproduction function, so that (1) can be rewritten as
A =Op(R/O), (2)
where p =p(R/O)is the probability of apprehension and conviction, which
in turn is a positive function of the resources-to-offenses ratio (RIO).
Alternatively, p is simply the ratio of apprehensions and convictions to
the number of offenses.
The economic theory of deterrence predicts that the number of
offenses will decline with an increase in the probability of apprehension




<0.Since we are assuming that only
offenders are apprehended and convicted, p in equations (2) and (3) is
identical.
A competitive enforcement industry, consisting of a large number of
firms that acquire property rights to offenses on a first-come first-served
basis, will act as if the number of offenses were unaffected by enforcement
activity. Yet expansions in the output of each firm will reduce—-though
by a negligible amount——the supply of offenses available to all other firms.
The sum of these negligible external effects is not negligible and hence
offenders will be deterred, and the supply of offenses will fall, as the
industry attempts to expand its output. This in turn will lead the industry
to readjust its level of enforcement activity. Moreover, as shown below,
attempts by the industry to expand its output in response to changes in
certain parameters may actually lead to a reduction in the industry's out-
put after it fully adjusts to changes in the number of offenses.6.
Since all firms are presumed to be equally efficient and(from the
assumption of an aggregate constant-returns-to_scale productionfunction)
there are no entrepreneurial resources specializedto the industry, com-
petition among firms will eliminate all profits and otherrents. Total
receipts in equilibrium will therefore equal total costs,as in
fA=r R, (4)
which can be rewritten
f =r/(0/R)p. (5)
The denominator in (5) is simply theaverage product of the hired resource.1'
Equilibrium, moreover, requires that values ofp and 0 that satisfy (5)
be consistent with the values of p and 0 impliedby the offenders' supply
function specified in (3).
The enforcement industry equilibrium together with theoffender-supply
equilibrium is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. At a fineequal to f0, both
the equilibrium output,A0 in Figure 1, and the number of offenses, 00 in
Figure 2, are simultaneously determined.A0 and 00 must satisfy the conditions
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
that the fine equal average cost for enforcers(f0 =rI(00/R0)p0) and that
the resulting probability (p0) yield a level of offendersequal to 00 in
Figure 2. The industry average cost curve (Ac) is drawn on theassumption
that the supply of offenses is fixed at00. Average cost is rising, there-
fore, since an increase in A (with 0 constant) comes aboutby increasing
the industry's inputs of R, which lowers theaverage product of R (as RIO
rises) and raises average cost. Any movement along the average-cost
curve in Figure 1, however, would alter the probability ofapprehension,
inducing a change in 0 via the offense function in Figure 2, and leadto









Figure I Figure II
0
A7.
equilibrium point along a given average-cost curve.
The stability of the equilibrium in Figure 1 can be shown as follows.
Suppose offenders adjust immediately to changes in p and let A exceed
A0 in Figure 1. Since p is now greater than p0. the number of offenses
will fall below 00 and the average-cost curve will shift upward, so that
the industry will be operating at a point such as X in Figure 1. With
average cost exceeding the fine, however, firms will leave the industry
or reduce their output, reducing the ratio of R to 0 and lowering both
average cost and p. This in turn will increase the number of offenses,
which will shift the average—cost curve downward. Adjustments by both firms
and offenders will continue until industry output returns toA0. Similarly,
if A were initially less than A0 and hence the volume of offenses exceeded
00 (as p fell below p0), increases in R and decreases in 0 would return the
industry to A.
We now explore the implications of changes in several parameters of
the model.
1. Change in the Crime Rate. Suppose there is an exogenous increase
in the crime rate with f constant. The offense function in Figure 2 will
shift to the right. Let us assume that if p remained fixed atp0, the
number of offenses would rise by 20 per cent. The number will initially
by
rise/more than 20 per cent because with A unchanged, p will fall below
p0.
In response to the increase in offenses, average cost will fall below f and
the industry will attempt to expand output. Since f is unchanged, the
competitive equilibrium will be restored when the average product of R,
and hence average cost, return to their original levels. This requires
a proportional increase in R equal to the 20 per cent increase in offenses8.
in order to keep RIOconstant.In terms of Figure 1, the average cost
curve will have shifted to the right by 20 per cent and arrests and
convictions will have risen by 20 per cent, while p will have remained
constant.
2. Change in the Costs of Conviction. Assume that the costs of
convicting offenders rise as a result of a procedural change, for example
requiring higher standards of proof or excluding most confessions.
Initially, this would reduce p in Figure 1, lower the average product of
R, and raise average cost. In response, firms would begin to cut back on
their enforcement expenditures and the number of offenses would increase.
At the new equilibrium (at the unchanged fine of f0) the ratio of 0 to R
will have risen and p will have fallen in comparison to their original values.
3. Change in the Fine. Suppose the legislature increases the fine
for the particular offense from f0 to f1, as illustrated in Figures 1 and
2. If we assume that offenders adjust immediately to changes in p and f,
the number of offenses will fall below 0.121 It is not obvious whether
the enforcement industry at its original output of A0 is now operating
where average cost is less or greater than the new price. The decline in
offenses may be of sufficient magnitude to raise average cost (and reduce
the average product of R) proportionately more than the increase in f.
In that event firms will exit from the industry or reduce their levels of
output, and R and A will decline. Alternatively, if the reduction in
offenses still leaves average cost below f1, output will expand. In
equilibrium-—where profits are competed away——average cost must rise by
the same proportion as f rises. Since we have assumed that there are no
scale effects in the enforcement industry (from the assumptions of constant
I returnsto scale and a fixed price of R) average cost will rise (and the9.
average product of R will fall) only if the ratio of R to 0increases.
Of particular importance is the fact thatthe increase in the equilibrium
ratio of R to 0 also produces an increase in
p. Thus, although there
is no clear prediction as to the numberof apprehensions and convictions
when the fine increases (as indicatedby the two possible supply curves,
S0 and S1, in Figure 1), the model unambiguously predicts an increase in
the probability of apprehension andconviction.
The intuitive explanation Ofthi5
relationship between p and f is as
cfiErease in the fine has two effects: itinitially reduces the number of
offenses by increasing the expected cost ofan offense, and it increases the
returns to enforcers from apprehending an offender.The latter effect may
well, though it need not, lead to an increase in thenumber of apprehensions.
If so, it is clear that the result will bean increase in the probability
of apprehension and conviction. The less intuitivecase is where the increase
in the penalty has so great a deterrent effecton offenders that it results
in a reduction in the scale of the enforcementindustry, i.e., in fewer
apprehensions. Still, the return per apprehension ishigher, and therefore
the industry will spend greaterresources than before per apprehension. This
in turn implies that the ratio of theindustry's total expenditures to the
number of offenders will be higher, since otherwisethe average cost of
catching an offender would not have risen. If moreresources are being
spent per offender, the probability of apprehenshion willrise.
The positive relationship, under privateenforcement, between the
probability of apprehension and conviction and thepenalty has, as we show
next, important implications for comparisons betweenprivate and optimal
public enforcement.10.
B. Optimal Public and Private Enforcement Compared
We follow Becker in defining the social loss from crime as
L =D(O)+C(O,p)+bpfO, (6)
where D is the net damages (harm to victims minus gain to offenders),
C(O,p) is the costs of apprehension and conviction, and bpfO is the
social costs of punishment.---'However,we make several simplifying
assumptions:
(1) All penalties are fines and the costs of collecting them are
zero. Hence bpfO is zero.
(2) The aggregate enforcement production function yields constant
returns to scale.
(3) The cost of apprehending and convicting offenders is identical
under private and public enforcement--that is, technological conditions,
enforcement incentives, and factor prices are independent of whether
enforcement is public or private.
(4) Fines greater than f* are uncollectable because they exceed the
offenderts resources, and hence they would have no greater deterrent effect
than f* ?P1
(5) When f =f*and p is arbitrarily close to zero, net marginal
damages are both positive (i.e., D' >0)and an increasing function of the
number of offenses (i.e., D" >0)..?i" If the social loss is then minimized
with respect to p and f, the fine will be set at the maximum amount collect-
able (f*) and L will be minimized with respect to p. As p rises however,
the decline in marginal damages due to the reduction in offenses must be
balanced against the marginal costs (assumed to be positive) of increasing p.
I•11.
47___ LI— Theincreasing costs of enforcement as the number of offenses falls
is the source of our final assumption: (6) theoptimal number of offenses
derived from the social loss function is always positive.
Assumptions (4), (5) and (6) merely formalize what one observes in
the real world--a positive number of offenses, andan enforcement system
that combines penalties with apprehensions and convictions.
will be
Our first step / to determine the appropriate fine underprivate
enforcement. We shall then compare the number of apprehensions,offenses,
etc. at this fine under public and private enforcement.
Minimizing the social loss function (6) with respect top and f
subject to the constraint of private enforcement
that is, subject to
f -r/(O/R)p=0, (7)





where L/f and L/p are the changes in the social lossresulting from
infinitesimal increases in f and p. The left-hand side of (8) denotes
the rate at which a change in p is traded off for a unitchange in f to
maintain a constant social loss, while the right-hand side denotesthe
rate at which enforcers change p in response to a unit change in f.
Observe that —(L/f)/(L/p) isposjtfvewhen (8) holds since theright—hand
side of (8) is always positive.
To providea more intuitive understanding of the equilibrium conditions
andtheirimplications for private versus public enforcement, we introduce
the concept of social loss indifference curves (SLIC). Agiven SLIC
shows
various combinations of p and f that yielda constant social loss,





dL=O D'O +— O(l-)
where =p'(R/O)/p,and =
_O(P/O).
--'Thelocation and shape of
SLIC's are determined as follows. At the maximum collectable fine (f* in
Figure 3), find the p that (locally) minimizes the social loss function,
and repeat for smaller and smaller fines. The curve labeled L/p =0in
Figure 3 is a locus of points showing the value of p that minimizes the
social loss for different values of f. This curve is (typically) negatively
sloped, indicating that an exogenous increase in f leads to a reduction in
p under a system of optimal public enforcement. This result is in
sharp contrast to the positive impact of increases in f on p in a system
of private enforcement, illustrated in Figure 3 by the positively sloped
curve PR1.When f <f*,the slope of each SLIC (see equation (9)) at the
point where it intersects the curve labeled aL/op =0is vertical (infinite
since L/p =0and L/f <0.
[Insert Figure 3]
At points above L/ap =0,the SLIC slope is positive because increases in
p raise the social loss and this must be compensated for by an increase in
f to maintain a constant social loss. Similarly, at points below L/p =0
the SLIC slope is negative because increases in both p and f lower the social
loss
Several indifference curves 1i, I2 and 13) are illustrated in Figure
3. Since the social loss falls as f increases with p constant (from









More generally, the further to the right the indifference curve in Figure
3, the lower the social loss. The optimal p and f in Figure 3 are found
by equating the rate at which profit-maximizing enforcers increasep in
response to a change in f to the rate at which p must increase as f increases
to maintain an unchanged social loss. This occurs at point X in Figure
3 where the optimal fine and probability aref1 and p1 respectively. At
this point, however, the indifference curve is positively sloped, which
implies that a reduction in p would lead to a lower social loss (L/p >0).
The minimum social loss at f1 occurs along the curve labeledL/p =0in
Figure 3-—and along this curve the value of p (=p0) is less than the cor-
responding p(=p1) generated by private enforcement. Put differently, the
"best" one can do under private enforcement is to set a fineequal to f1,
but at f1 one observes a greater probability of apprehension and conviction
(p1 >p0)and a greater social loss under private than optimal public enforce-
ment.
The intuitive explanation for the overenforcement theorem is
straightforward, If the probability of apprehension and conviction were
unity, the optimum fine would be set equal to the social costs of illegal
activity-—i.e., to the value of crime prevention. If the value of crimepre-
vention rose because the harm from crime was increasing, the optimum fine
would rise by the same amount. This would be perceived by enforcersas an
upward shift in the demand curve facing them, and would have the effect of
increasing the resources devoted to crime prevention, as in the case of an
ordinary product the demand for which increases. The difficulty arises
because in the design of an optimum system of penalties where theprobability
of apprehension and conviction is less than unity, the fine is sethigher
I14.
than the social costs of the illegal activity not asa signal that addi-
tional resources should be devoted to the activity because its valuehas
increased relative to other activities but rather as a device forattempting
to minimize those resources. A fine so set communicates thewrong signal,
from a social standpoint, to the private enforcer. In thecase of public
enforcement, the high fine need not be taken as a signal to invest greater
resources in crime prevention, since the public enforcer is not constrained
to act as a private profit maximizer.
In showing that private enforcement is less efficient thanoptimum
public enforcement, we have not established a case for preferring public to
private enforcement. That would require a comparison between private and
actual, not optimal, public enforcement, a comparison very difficult to
make without a theory of the behavior of public enterprises. Theexcess—
enforcement theorem is nonetheless useful, as shown in Part IV, inexplaining
policies designed to limit the scale of law-enforcement activities.
110 SOME EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
The model of private enforcement developed in the previouspart contains
a number of restrictive assumptions, such as that enforcement is competitive,
rights in legal claims are assigned on a first—come first—served basis,
enforcers are not taxed, penalties always take the form ofmonetary fines,
and errors in enforcement never occur. These assumptions willnow be relaxed.
A. Monopoly Enforcement
If the private-enforcement industry is monopolistic rather thancom-
petitive, it will take account of the fact that increases in the level of
enforcement reduce the number of offenses. The result will be fewercon-
victionsand higher profits than under competition..!I15.
p
Themonopolist maximizes
11= f0p= rR (10)






and 0 <j5, w <1. In equation (11), r/p'w equals the marginal cost
of apprehensions and convictions. Marginal cost is greater, the smaller p'
and the larger (since wisinversely related to er). As approaches
unity, marginal cost approaches infinity since additional expenditures on
enforcement produce no additional apprehensions. Since p', the marginal
product of R in producing apprehensions and convictions (assuming 0 constant),
is a decreasing function of RIO, marginal cost will also be an increasing
function of output (see Figure 4). .--"
[Insert Figure 4]
Figure 4 shows that competition yields a level of enforcement greater
than the level produced by a monopolist (A0 > A0*) even though demand is
infinitely elastic. At A0 marginal cost exceeds averageS cost, and a
profit-maximizing monopolist would reduce enforcement until marginal cost
equaled f0.
--'Monopolywill thus be associated with fewer apprehensions
and convictions, a greater number of offenses, and a lower probability of
apprehension and conviction than competition.
The optimal fine and level of enforcement under monopoly are deter-
mined by minimizing the social loss function subject to the constraint
specified in (11) that marginal revenue equal marginal cost. This yields












The left-hand side of (13) is the slope of the social loss indifference
curve (SLIC) while the right-hand side (which is always positive) is the
rate at which the monopolistic enforcer increases p in response to a unit
increase in f. Figure 5 illustrates the determination of the pptimal p
and f under monopoly and competition. PR2 is the constraint under which
the monopolistic enforcer operates and PR1 the constraint of the competi-
tive enforcement industry. Since the profit—maximizing p at each f is
lower under monopoly than under competition, and the rate at which the
monopolistic enforcer increases p in order to maximize profits in response
to an increase in f is lower than the rate under competition, the
monopolistic enforcer attains a higher social loss indifference curve
(i.e., a lower social loss). We emphasize that excessive enforcement
results even under monopoly, because the point of tangency between the PR
curve and the social loss indifference curve still occurs in a region where
the latter curve is positively sloped so
one can find a lower p (holding f constant) that yields a lower social
loss.
[Insert Figure 5]
Insum, private competitive enforcement (with property rights
obtainable only on a first-come first-served basis) yields a greater social
lossfrom crime (considering all relevant costs) than private enforcement
by a monopolist or cartel. Although the optimal fine is smaller under
competitive than monopolistic enforcement, the equilibrium p may be greater










in general. This finding modifies our earlier result, where for a given
f the value of p was always greater under competition than monopoly. When
the fine is also endogenous, it will be higher under monopoly than under
competition. This will induce an increase in p and it will no longer be
possible to predict that p will be smaller under monopoly.
B. State and Victim Ownership of Property Rights in Legal Claims
In the well known analysis of a free-access resource, competition
carries the level of production "too far" because social marginal cost
exceeds price at the competitive output. The problem is the absence of
property rights. If someone owned the resources, the price he would
charge for its use in order to maximize his return would yield a level of
output at which social marginal cost was equal to price; alternatively a
cartel of firms using the free-access resource would maximize profits by
internalizing the external technical diseconomies that firms impose on one
another, reducing output until social marginal cost was equal to price.
Similarly, the only reason why competitive private enforcement yields a
larger output than monopolistic private enforcement at the same fine is
that in the former case no one has a property right in offenses (save as
acquired on a first-come first-served basis). If instead the state owned
the initial rights to all offenses (analogous to ownership of the formerly
free-access resource) and auctioned them off to private enforcers, it can
beshown that the profit-maximizing fee for each apprehension and conviction,
given a fine equal to f0,would equal the difference between marginal and
averagecost at A0* in Figure 4. Thus, competitive enforcement, combined
withthe initial ownershipofoffenses by the state(or by a private firm),
I18.
would yield an output of A0*, the same output themonopolistic enforcer
would produce. However, the fee charged by the state is equivalent
to a tax on the enforcer's output, and since this "tax" createsa dis-
crepancy between the amount offenders pay and the amount enforcers receive,
it provides incentives for bribery and corruption (seenext subpart).
Another possible system of property rights in legal claims wouldbe
to assign them to the victims of offenses. The victim who had the
exclusive right to prosecute the offender could attempt toapprehend and
convict the offender himself, or hire private enforcers,or sell his right
to an enforcer, or refrain from enforcement. As a firstapproximation,
victim enforcement (assuming a large number of victims andprofit-maximizing
behavior) would produce a level of apprehensions and convictions somewhere
between A0 and A0* in Figure 4. Victjm enforcement eliminates theexternal
diseconomjesassociated with the duplication of effort and costs when several
enforcers pursue a singleoffender; but no victim has asufficiently large
shareof the market to internalize the negativeresponse of offenders to
his enforcement activity. However, this is only a partial analysis.
We have seen that private monopolistic enforcement (orvesting all rights
initially in the state) results in a level of enforcement that maximizes
the private return to enforcement. It follows that a firm whichacquired
all victims' rights would be able to offer each victima higher price than
hecould expect to obtain from any other enforcement alternative--so all the
rights would be acquiredby a single firm.Itneed not do all, or any, of
theactual enforcing itself--it may resell the rights to enforcersor require
them to pay it a "royalty" for each offender convicted--but inany event the
price per offender will be set at a level at which some offenses are not19.
prosecutedthat would be prosecuted under a system of competitive enforce-
ment of victim rights.
This is not to say that the equilibrium condition of every market
(absent an antitrust law) is monopolistic because the assets of the indus-
trywould be more valuable in the hands of a single firm which could charge
a monopoly price. In an ordinary market, the charging of a monopoly price
inducesnew entry and this prospect reduces the expected profits of mono-
polization, often to the point where they are lower than the expected
profits of competitive operation when the costs of obtainingthe monopoly
aretaken into account. There is no threat of entry into the enforcement
market,since (abstracting from the problem of the fabricated offense, dis-
cussed later) firms are not free to produce offenders. The right to operate
in the enforcement market is limited to the victims of offenses, and the
number of offenses prosecuted is controlled by the single enforcer who
acquiresall of the victim rights.
To summarize, if property rights to offenders are acquired by the
state (or by a private monopoly) and then sold at profit-maximizing prices
toenforcers, competitive enforcement will lead to the identical solution
as enforcement by a monopolist (see Figure 5). Thus, the economic function
of this form of property rights is to produce a lower social loss from crime
thancompetitive enforcement withoutthese pro-
perty rights. Victim property rights without the sale of those rights to
a single (i.e., monopoly) enforcer would lead to a partial internalization
of the external diseconomies produced in the absence of any property rights.
Thecurve relating p to f in Figure 5 would presumably lie between PR2
and PR1, and hence the social loss with victim enforcement would be less
I thanthe social loss in the absence of property rights but greater than the20.
social loss when property rights are assigned to the stateor are acquired
by a single enforcer. In all our examples of private enforcement,however,
excessive enforcement results. This occurs because at theequilibrium
position in Figure 5, whatever the private enforcement scheme, the social
loss indifference curve is positively sloped; soone can always find a
lower p. holding f constant, that yields a lower social loss.
A different sort of problem that a system ofawarding rights to
enforcers on a first-come first-served basis creates isallowing the offender
to nullify the deterrent effect of the law by turning himself in and
receiving the fine or bounty to which an enforcer is entitled. The payment
of the fine to himself washes out the penalty and allows him to retainthe
proceeds of the unlawful act without bearing any punishment cost. This
abuseof the private enforcement concept could in principle beprevented
eitherby disentitling offenders to compensation as enforcers or bygranting
exclusive rights to enforce the law to victims of offenses, but neither
solution would be free from practical difficulty. It would be hard to
prevent the offender from hiring an enforcer as his agent to turn him in
and receive the reward, or, in a system of victim rights, fromusing the
hired enforcer to purchase the enforcement right from the victim (without
disclosure, of course, that the enforcer was acting on behalf of the
offender).
Thesimplest way of dealing with this problem would be to give the
victim of the offense the right to claim, either from the enforceror from
the offender, the value of any property taken from him, ordamaged, by the
offender. But this solution is not wholly adequate. The difficulty lies
in the fact that the offender is usually in a position topreempt any other21.
enforcer:if he gets wind that an enforcer is closing in on him, he
can turn himself in first, and obtain the reward. This possibility may
enable offenders to nullify the effects of enforcement, even when resti-
tution to the victim is required and is effective. Consider the following
example. The value of the property taken by the offender is $10, the
probability of apprehension and conviction is .01, and the punishment is
$1000. The offender knows that if he conunits 100 offenses, he is likely
to be punished once; and assume that when apprehension is imminent, he
can always turn himself in first and obtain the reward. Then the effective
punishment for the offense is not $1000, but $10 (the required restitution),
and the expected punishment cost per offense is not $10, but 10 cents.
C. Taxation of Enforcers
En principle, one could devise a system of taxes on enforcers, combined
with a system of property rights, that would induce enforcers to reduce their
activity to a level at which p would lie along the L/p =0curve. The
tax would shift the demand curve as perceived by the enforcers to the left
without reducing f and thereby impairing the deterrent effect of the law.
However, the tax would drive a wedge between what offenders paid and what
enforcersreceived and thereby create attractive opportunities for bribery
and corruption, for both the apprehended offender and the enforcer would
be better off privately negotiating a payment that was less than the statu-
tory fine but greater than the fine minus the tax. A major criticism of
public enforcement advanced by Becker and Stigler, that it creates incentives
forbriberyand corruption because the gain to the enforcer from enforcement
isgenerally less than the offender's potential penalty, might no
longer be a strong argument for private enforcement (depending on the size
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of the tax) if enforcers were taxed in order to reduce the levelof
enforcement to the optimum level. The distinction betweenprivate and
public enforcement would become blurred in another sense—-the character
and effectiveness of private enforcement would becomedependent, in part
at least, on a form of public intervention, albeita milder form than
regulation or public ownership.
Two further points need to be made about the briberyproblem created
by taxation of enforcers. First, that problem is less acute ifrights are
assigned on a first—come first—served basis. An offender would be reluctant
to bribe an enforcer since the bribe would not buy him absoluteimmunity
from punishment--any other enforcer would be perfectly free toinstitute
proceedings against the offender. However, the first enforcer would sometimes
have a "corner" on the information incriminating theoffender, in which case
the probability of a second enforcer's apprehending the offenderwould be
slight.
Second, a tax on transaction creates a potential for bribery--an
employee has an incentive to bribe his employer (by rebating a portion of
his wages) not to withhold a portion of hiswages for payment of federal
income tax—-yet we do not ordinarily assume that thepossibility of bribery
is a serious objection to using taxes to collectrevenues. This is partly
because there appear to be no good alternatives, andpartly because bribery
itself can presumably be deterred by appropriate penalties-—andis, indeed,
a criminal offense. Assuming bribery of enforcers could be prevented
effectively and at moderate cost by being penalized, we may not have to
worry very much about the incentives to commit bribery that a tax on enforce-
ment would create--but by the same token the problem of bribery wouldbecome
a less compelling criticism of public enforcement.23.
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D.Imprisonment and Other Nonmonetary Sanctions
The incentive to commit bribery is also present once we relax the
unrealistic assumption that an optimal system of penalties would consist
solely of fines. When imprisonment and other sanctions that are not a
simple transfer payment from offender to enforcer are introduced, it
becomes necessary for the state to offer bounties to enforcers if there
is to be adequate incentive for private enforcement. Assuming that the
optimum system of penalties continues to involve a combination of severe
penalties with low probabilities of apprehension and conviction--a realis-
tic assumption even though increases in the penalty can no longer be assumed
to be costless—-a bounty that is the precise monetary equivalent of the
costs of the penalty to the offender will induce excessive enforcement, as
enforcerspour resources into apprehending and convicting offenders and
raise p above its (low) optimal level. If, however, the bounties are set
below f so as to reduce enforcement to the optimal level, there will be a
gap between the cost of punishmentto the offender and the gain to the
enforcer,and opportunities for bribery and other corruption will be intro-
duced. Theproblem may, however, be less severe than it would be under a
system of fines only. The bounties, even though smaller than the cost of
punishment to the offender, may exceed his ability to pay since it is the
limitations on offenders' resources that require reliance on nonpecuniary
penalties in the first place.
E.Errors in Enforcement
In developing a model of private enforcement in Part I, we unrealistically
assumed that enforcement operated without any mistakes. Once that assumption
is abandoned it becomes apparent that an enforcement industry, whether public24.
or private, has two outputs, the conviction of theguilty and of the
innocent. The second has a negative social value.Even when the penalty
imposed upon the convicted defendant is apure transfer payment, the
resources consumed in the prosecution are wasted froma social standpoint;
the deterrent effect of the law is alsoimpaired. Is the output of this
social bad--convictions of innocentpeople--likely to be greater or smaller
under private enforcement than under publicenforcement?
The private enforcer is paid per offenderconvicted, regardless of
the actual guilt or innocence of the accused. Thereare several ways in
which the enforcer can increase his "catch," and hencehis income, by
augmenting the supply of "offenders." (1) He can fabricatean offense.
(2) He can prosecute an innocent person foran offense that in fact occurred.
(3) He can encourage an individual to commitan offense that he would not
have committed without encouragement, and thenprosecute him for the offense;S
thisis the practice known as "entrapment." (4)Knowing that an individual
is about to attempt the commission of acrime, the enforcer can wait until
the crime has been committed and thenprosecute him rather than apprehend him
in the attempt stage and prosecute him fora criminal attempt. The incentive
for waiting to obtain greater compensation, since thepenalty for the com-
pleted crime will presumably beheavierthan the penalty for theattempt.
These abuses would doubtless occur underany system of private enforce-
ment4?ut how frequently? Thefirst two involve the prosecution of an
innocent person, and in general we wouldexpect expenditures by the party
whose claims are true to be more productive than the otherparty's expendi-
tures; hence expenditures on trying to "frame" an innocentperson would
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normally be a poor investment. Entrapment is/well-recognized defense25.
to a criminal charge, so a prosecution based on entrapment would rarely
be a valuable use of the enforcer's resources. —Asfor the enforcer
who stood by and allowed the completed crime to occur, he would have to
reckon with the possibility that someone else might apprehend and convict
the criminal--especially under a system where the property right to a
legal claim was vested in the victim of a crime.
In any event, the same abuses can and do arise under public enforcement--
indeed, the constitutional rules against entrapment, knowing suppression of
evidence favorable to the accused, etc., were developed to prevent the
commission of these practices by public enforcers——and there is no good
theoretical or empirical basis for expecting them to be more widespread
undera system of private enforcement. True, the private enforcer is com-
pensated on an explicitly piecework basis, and the public enforcer is not.
Thismay make it more likely that the public enforcer would attempt to
maximize deterrence rather than merely the number of convicted offenders
weighted by the penalty (net of the costs of enforcement). The other
side of the coin, however, is that the private enforcer may be more sensitive
to the costs of the unsuccessful prosecution, and we have indicated why
the costs of successfully prosecuting innocent people will often be very
high.
Areinadvertent errors likely to be more or less frequent under private
ascompared to optimum enforcement (or public enforcement, if we assume that
the enforcement level is more nearly optimum under public enforcement)? Dis-
regarding deliberate error, we may assume that a given fraction of all
enforcement proceedings, either public or private, terminates in the convic-
tion of an innocent person, and ask whether there are likely to be more
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enforcement proceedings under private than underpublic enforcement and,
if so, whether it follows that theaggregate error costs will be higher
under the former system.
Assuming the legislature has set the optimalfine--f1 in Figure 5--
given the constraint of private enforcement. The
resulting probability
of apprehension and conviction,p1. now includes the conviction of innocent
as well as guilty persons. Since optimal public enforcement atf1 would
occur at a lower p (along the L/p =0curve), the number of innocent
persons convicted would be lower under public enforcement, provided that
the elasticity of offenses with respect toa change in p was less than
unity. While the number of erroneous convictions willthus be higher under
private enforcement, the social cost of each error will be lowersince the
optimal penalty is higher under public enforcement. (InFigure 5, social
cost is minimized under public enforcement bysetting the fine equal to f*,
and f* >f1,the optimal fine under private enforcement.) To besure, the
optimal p is also lower at f* thanf1, but if offenders are less sensitive
to changes in f than to changes inp (i.e., Cf < < 1where =Of(f/0)),
the increase in f may be significantly greater than thereduction in p.
resulting in the imposition of greater aggregate costs on innocentpersons
under public enforcement.
In sum the social costs of legal errormay be no greater (or smaller)
under private than under optimum public enforcement.Therefore, a model
such as that developed in Pa,I which ignoreslegal error may still be
quite useful in differentiating private from optimum public enforcement.
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III.CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Our conclusion that the market cannot be depended upon to optimize
law enforcement will not come as a surprise. Economists have long assumed
that a regime of private enforcement would founder either because of free-
rider problems or because of economies of scale. But it is important to
note that ours is not the conventional reasoning. We agree that, in a
system of private enforcement where victims purchased the services of
enforcers, there would be a free-rider problem: nonpurchasers would bene-
fit from the reduction in illegal activities brought about by the hired
enforcers. However, the free-rider problem does not arise under systems
ofprivate enforcement in which enforcers purchase rights from victims, or
from the state, or acquire rights by apprehending and convicting an offender.
The reason is that in these systems the return to enforcement is a fine,
whereasunder a system in which enforcers are precluded from receiving fines
the return to enforcement must come from those buying protection.
There appear to be substantial economies of scale in some areas of law
enforcement. Ifthe collection of federal taxes were privatized, it seems
unlikely that the marketwould have room for more than one Internal Revenue
Service,albeit other sorts of taxes could be (and historically sometimes
have been) farmed out for collectionto private enforcers. Just as running
two setsof telephone lines down the same streetiswasteful, sohavingtwo
enforcersaudit the books of the same taxpayer would be wasteful. Two FBPs,
or two police departments in the same city, would create similar problems
of uneconomical duplication.
Itmight seem that ifenforcement would often be produced under con-
ditions of natural monopoly, the case for public enforcement would be
I strengthenedbecause private monopolies are not clearly preferable to public28.
ones.However, one of the social costs of monopoly--themisallocation
resulting from the monopolist's restriction ofoutput--is a social bene-
fit in the enforcement context since,as we have shown, monopoly enforce-
ment reduces the net social loss from illegalactivity. A second cost
of monopoly--the expenditure of resources toacquire a monopoly--may or
may not be substantial in the enforcement context. If the state
grants
an exclusive franchise under the usual "public convenienceand necessity"
criterion, the franchisee will receive a valuableasset; firms will compete
for this asset, spending real resources suchas lawyers' and lobbyists'
time; and the total costs of trying to obtain the franchisemay
(assuming there are no rents in the procuring offranchises) be as great
as the value of the franchise. If, however,monopoly came about as a result
of theactivity of a firm in buying up victim rights, rather thanobtaining
a franchise,the social costs would be lower. Monopolyrents that might
otherwisebe used to purchase inputs into theacquisition of a franchise
would be exhausted in payments to victims for theirrights to offenses.
Some costs would result from duplication insoliciting victim rights, but
these costs might be no greater than the usualcosts of competing for new
customers.
Weconclude that neither free-rider problemsnor economies of scale
provide a compelling basis for public law enforcement. Butclearly there
is more work to be done on this question. It isat least suggestive that
the economies of scale in enforcementappear to be concentrated in the
investigative phase of enforcement (patrolling,auditing, etc.) and that
many of the traditionally "private law" areas of law, such as torts and
contracts, do not require much investigation. The victim ofan accident
knows that he has been injured and,ordinarily, who did it. The same is29.
true of breaches of contract. No permanent investigative apparatus
corresponding to a public utility's plant is needed in these areas, and
this may be part of the reason why they have been left to private enforce-
ment.
IV. POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
A. TheChoice Between Publicand Private Enforcement:
Criminal Compared to Contract and Tort Cases
A major positive implication of our model relates to the different
mixtureof public and private enforcement in criminal and other traditional
"public law" areas, on the one hand, and tort, contract, and other tradi-
tionally "private law" areas on the other. With few exceptions, there is
apublic monopoly--more precisely a series ofpublic monopolies--of
criminal-law enforcement: a private individual may not prosecute for
murder, or theft, or the possession of marijuana, or statutory rape.
Often, to be sure, the same act is both a crime and a tort (the crime of
theft, for example, is the tort of conversion), and then private enforcement
is possible in principle. But if the offender is judgment-proof, as is so
oftenthe case with criminal offenders, the tort remedy is ineffectual and
the public enforcer has a de facto monopoly. In contrast, in areas of the law
such as contracts and torts (excluding those torts that are also crimes)
themain burden of enforcement falls on the private sector. Breaches of
contract, and torts, are not investigated or prosecuted by the state. The
state's role is limited to furnishing the court system.
In terms of our model, the essential difference between crimes, on
the one hand, and torts and breaches of contract, on the other, is that
with very small resources devoted to apprehension, the probability of
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apprehension tends to be much less than one in the formercase, and to
approach one in the second. The victim of a breach of contract knows
who breached it; the victim of an automobile accidentusually knows the
identityof the other driver; but the victim of a burglary does not
know the burglar's identity. Where the probability ofapprehension and
convictionis unity, it can easily be shown that the penalty that minimizes
the social loss from unlawful activity is equal to thesum of the costs of
the harm inflicted by the activity and of the costs ofenforcement.
Thus, assuming that p is approximately unity in theaverage tort or con-
tract case, the problem of overenforcement discussed in Part Icannot arise.
It arose because, in a case where substantial resourcesare necessary to
generate a substantial probability of apprehension, those resources can be
saved by setting a very high f, but the high f inducesprivate enforcers to
expend resources on apprehension--the resources that the high f was intended
to conserve. If p is already unity, private enforcers will notexpend any
resources on trying to increase p any further.
A problem would remain if property rights were assigned to enforcers
on a first-come first-served basis rather than to the victim of the tort
or breach of contract. For example, if the marginal harm inflicted by the
offender's conduct were $9 and the marginal costs of apprehension andcon-
viction were $1, and hence f =$10,the enforcer who was the first to stake
his claim would receive a rent of $9. The opportunity to obtain suchrents
might lead enforcers to stake claims simultaneously, to duplicate enforce-
ment costs, or to engage in other methods of spending (e.g.,bribing the
official in charge of recording claims) that consumedresources. Thus,
enforcement on a first-come first-served basis would induceexpenditures31.
onenforcement in excess of $1. Victim rights eliminate this source of
waste.
Thusour model predicts--and we in fact observe——greater reliance
on private enforcement in areas such as tort, contract, property, and
commercial law, where p approaches unity and victim property rights are
practicable(i.e.,the cost of enforcing an individual claim is low rela-
tive to the value of the claim). The criminal area presents the opposite
extreme, especially in 'Victimless" crimes such as tax evasion and prostitution
or "inchoate" crimes (various types of attempt). Most criminal acts are
concealable, which means that unless substantial resources were devoted
to enforcement p would be much smaller than unity; and the cost of enforce-
ment to the victim--if there is a victim--is high because the average
criminal offender is judgment—proof. Private enforcement of the criminal
law would require the institution of a comprehensive public bounty system,
and any divergence between the bounty and the cost of punishment would
createproblems.
Torepeat an earlier point, we are not arguing that private criminal—
law enforcement is in fact less efficient than public. However, the fact
that society has left enforcement to the private sector in areas where
private enforcement is clearly optimal is consistent with the view that
the design of our legal institutions has been heavily influenced by economic
considerations, and the fact that it has tended to reject private enforcement
in those areas where private enforcement is not optimal, and might not be
superior to public enforcement, may also be consistent with such a view of
legal institutions.
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B. The Assignment of Property Rights inLegal Claims
A system of law enforcement is implicitlya market in legal claims,
and like other markets cannot functionefficiently unless there are
exclusive rights to the goods in the market, theclaims. Although the
legal system does not characterize the matter in theseterms, there are
in fact exclusive rights in claims. The victimof an alleged violation
of law has the exclusive right to bring suitto redress the violation (we
are abstracting now from public enforcement). He sellsthat right to the
defendant when the case is settled out of court.If the case is litigated,
and the defendant wins, the plaintiff'slegal claim is extinguished under
the doctrine of res judicata; if theplaintiff wins, the doctrine is invoked
to prevent relitigation of the same issue betweenthe same parties--i.e.,
to prevent the (coerced) purchase of the plaintiff'sclaim by the defendant
from being undone. S
Insome cases the cost of enforcement is so high relative to thevalue
of the claim that the legal-claims "market" wouldnot work if the principle
that the victim had the exclusive right to the claimwere adhered to strictly.
A good example is a price-fixingconspiracy that imposes a small cost on
each member of a large class of buyers. Thetotal social costs of the
violation may be high, so that enforcement would besocially efficient, but
none of the victims has a sufficiently large stake to bewilling to bear the
expenses of suit. The consumer class action is a device, although an
oblique and imperfect one, for overcoming thisproblem. In effect the
property rights normally possessed by the victims of analleged violation
are reassigned to the lawyer for the class. Subject tocertain controls
(probably rather weak) by the court, the lawyercan transfer the victims'33.
property rights--without their consent in any meaningful sense--to the
defendant. The proceeds of the transfer are divided between the lawyer
and the state with little or nothing being paid to the nominal
sellers of the claim, the members of the class.
While it makes sense to assign rights on a first-come first-served
basis in cases where the costs of enforcement are very high relative to
theindividual victim's stake, in other cases exclusive victim rights
would appear tobe a more efficient assignment of property rights; and
this, roughly is the pattern we observe in the real world. A first-come
first-servedsystem would involve at least two problems besides that of
external technical diseconomies which we discussed in Part II. The first
is the problem of appropriability. Enforcer A begins an investigation of
violator X, collects extensive information, and is prepared to file suit
when enforcer B, having heard about A's investigation, files suit against
X first. A and B are bilateral monopolists, and while A will get something
from B for the information he has collected, his gains from the investiga-
tion will be smaller than if he had had a secure property right. The prob—
lem of appropriability here is very similar to that in the market for
•inventions, and for the same reason: in both cases the commodity being
produced is information.
A could have solved his problem by filing suit before beginning to
investigate. This, however, suggests another problem of a first-come
first—served system: excessive rewards. It would be inefficient to confer
exclusive enforcement rights, potentially of great value, on people who
have merely conceived the possibility of suing somebody for something.
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People would spend their time drafting and filing barebones complaints
charging large corporations with violations of various laws, and then
sit back and wait for the people with investigative skills andresources
to purchase their claims. The investment of resources in drafting and
filing would be socially excessive.
There are techniques for getting around these problems, embodied
for example in the patent laws. These laws could be adapted for use
in the market for legal claims, but the result might not bevery satisfactory.
The patent analogy might prove useful, however, in sorting out claimsamong
enforcers in class-action situations, where the principle of victim rights
is and must be largely disregarded.
Another reason for preferring the existing system of victim rights
is that efficiency sometimes requires that the victim of an unlawful act
be compensated therefor. For example, under a negligence system in which
the right to seek damages is owned by the victim of a negligently inflicted
injury, the traveler at a railroad crossing will take only those precautions
that are cost—justified, where the expected accident cost is calculated on
the assumption that the railroad is complying with its duties under the
negligence standard. The potential victim will not take precautions against
accidents that would occur only if the railroad violated its duties--behaved
negligently--because the victim of such an accident, being fully compensated
for any injury resulting from it, is indifferent to whether it occurs and
will incur no cost to prevent it. Suppose, however, that the victim has
no right to be compensated if he is injured in a negligently inflicted
accident-—anyone has the right to sue in respect of that accident and to
collect and retain damages from the railroad. The railroadmay now have35.
an incentive to increase the number of accidents at railroad crossings
far above the optimal level. Its aim will be to make crossing a railroad
track an extremely hazardous activity. At first there will bemany
accidents and the railroad will have to pay private enforcers--not victims-—
substantial judgments. Potential victims, however, not being compensated
when injured no matter how negligent the railroad's conduct, will soon begin
to take measures to protect themselves from crossing accidents. Theymay
cease to use railroad crossings altogether; they may induce the municipal
authorities to build an underpass. The number of accidents will fall and
the result will be a reduction in the railroad's costs of accident avoidance
that may exceed (even after discounting to present value) the costs of
answering to private enforcers in damages for the many injuries negligently
inflicted during the initial period of reckless behavior. The elimination
of accidents will have been achieved by a method that is sociallysuboptimal.
There is another way to avoid this problem besides compensating victims,
and that is to divorce liability from the infliction of injury.In our
example, this would mean imposing speed limits and other forms of direct
regulation on the railroad. But that implies additional public enforcement.
As another example of the allocative effects of compensation, consider
the consequences if rights to press claims based on breach of contractwere
obtained on a first-come first-served basis instead of being theproperty
ofthe victim of the breach. A contract is fundamentally a device for
allocating risk. IfA promises B delivery on a specified date, this means
thatA insures B againstthe risk of delayed delivery. The desire of the
partiesto place this risk onA would be thwarted if,in the event that A
failedto make delivery on the specified date, C,a stranger to the contract,
could sue A for the breach of contract. Z136.
We note in closing that the existing system of victim rights has
several drawbacks. For example, legal claims are not freely transferable.
A person injured in an accident cannot sell his legal claimagainst the
injurer to a lawyer or other enforcer. This means that he cannot shift
the risk created by the uncertainty of litigation (although he can share
it with his lawyer by means of a contigent fee agreement) andassuming that
risk aversion is prevalent the result may be underenforcement of legal
claims. And current law forbids lawyers to use the corporate form
to obtain capital in the capital markets, so even if they were permitted
to buy claims they would find it difficult to finance their purchases.
C. The Public Enforcer's Budget Constraint
Another positive implication of our analysis of private enforcement
relates to the fact that the budgets of public enforcement agencies tend
to be small in relation to the potential gains from enforcement as they
would be appraised by a private, profit-maximizing enforcer. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service has repeatedly (but unsuccessfully)
argued to its appropriations subcommittee that the Service is operating
at a budgetary level where the marginal cost of enforcement is far below
the marginal return, measured (as a private enforcer would measure it) by
the additional tax revenue that additional expenditures on enforcement would
generate. There is some evidence that its argument is correct. The
assumption of a budget constraint would be unrealistic as applied to a
private enforcer, for assuming reasonably well functioning capital markets
he would be able to finance any enforcement activities where the expected
monetaryreturn exceeded the expected costs.
The agency budget constraint is at first glance puzzling. Why isn't
thelegislature interested in maximizing the expected value of enforcement?37.
Whydoesn't it, therefore, appropriate additional funds to any agency,
such as the IRS, that could use the funds to increase the net yield of
enforcement? The puzzle disappears when we reflect that a method of
appropriation whereby the level of enforcement of the tax laws was allowed
to rise to the level that would be reached under a system of private enforce-
mentcould, according to the analysis in Part I, result in overenforcement.
The effect of the budget constraint, in forcing the public enforcer to
operate where marginal cost is less than marginal revenue and hence where
theprobability of apprehension and conviction is less than if profits
were maximized, is similar to that of a tax on private enforcement designed
toreduce the level of private enforcement to the socially optimal level.
There is, to be sure, an element of private enforcement in the enforce-
ment of the federal tax laws: the government pays informers a reward of up
to 10 per cent of any additional taxes collected as a result of the informer's
But,
tip. /were it not for the problem of overenforcement, it would be difficult
to understand why the maximum reward has been set at such a low percentage
of the revenues produced. If the objective were to carry enforcement of the
tax laws to the point where marginal revenue and marginal cost were equated,
a reward greatly in excess of 100 per cent of the additional revenues col-
lected might well be appropriate, since each apprehension resulting from an
informer's activity would have some effect in deterring other taxpayers from
underpayingtheir tax. Alternatively, the informer, rather than being
givena reward inexcess of the amount of tax collected, might be given a
rewardequal to the additional tax plus any penalties imposed (including
the monetary equivalent of the costs to the taxpayer of being imprisoned,
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where that was the penalty imposed). The effect of the 10per cent S
ceiling is to reduce drastically the scale that the tax informer industry
would attain under a system of pure private enforcement.
D. Discretionary Nonenforcement of the Law
A public monopoly of enforcement enables the public enforcer ineffect
to nullify particular laws, or particular applications of law,simply by
declining to prosecute violators. This power appears to be exercised fre-
quently and we attempt here to explain why. Our analysis of private
enforcement is relevant to the question since it is clear that enforcer
nullification would not be a feature of private enforcement: all laws would
be enforced that yielded a positive expected net return.
Both economic theory and simple observation suggest that rules of
law are almost always overinclusive: read literally, they forbidsome
conduct that the legislature or court that formulated the rule did not in
fact want to forbid. The costs of precisely tailoring a rule to the
conduct intended to be forbidden would be prohibitive given the limitations
of human foresight and the inherent ambiguities of human language. The
more particularly the legislature tried to describe the forbidden conduct,
the more loopholes it would open up.If enforced to the letter, an over-
inclusive rule could impose very heavy social costs. Analytically, the
effect would be like punishing an innocent person in order to reduce the
probability of acquitting a guilty one. To be sure, in an economic analysis
the danger of punishing the innocent is not decisive against theuse of a
particular method of law enforcement; the danger must be traded off against
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thecosts of alternative methods that would reduce it. But just as the
costs both of convicting the innocent and of acquitting the guilty can
bereduced simultaneously (e.g., by increasing the amount of resources
devoted to the determination of guilt and innocence), so there is a
technique--discretionary nonenforcement--by which the costs of overinciusion
can be reduced without a corresponding increase in underinclusion (loopholes).
The police overlook minor infractions of the traffic code; building inspec-
tors ignore violations of building-code provisions that, if enforced, would
prevent the construction of new buildings in urban areas; air traffic con-
trollers permit the airlines to violate excessively strigent safety regula-
tions involving the spacing of aircraft landing and taking off from airports.
This technique of reducing the costs of overinclusion would be
unavailable in a system of private enforcement. Suppose a rule prohibits
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D'2 +C'2+(C2/ap2)1/0 =0. (16)
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Suppose the marginal damages from 01 are smaller than from02 given an
equal number of offenses, and the enforcement costs are identical. Then
optimality clearly requires thatp1 be set lower than p2 and that more
offenses of type 1 be permitted than of type 2. The marginal damages from
01 may be zero (the activity was prohibited inadvertently), in which case
the optimal value ofp1 would be zero. Discretionary enforcement is a way
of adjusting to the fixed fine, and reduces the net social losscompared40.
tothe alternative of aggregating the two offensestogether and setting
a uniform p.In contrast, profit—maximizing enforcers wouldhave no
incentive to take account of the difference inmarginal damages between
the two offenses because both the fine andcosts of apprehension and con-
viction are assumed to be identical for both.If the costs of convicting
of01 were higher than of 02, perhaps because judges and jurieswere less
willing to convict persons accused of01, then differential private enforce-
ment would also emerge. But the difference incosts of conviction would
also enter into (14), implying that the differencein enforcement between
01 and 02 would be even greater under optimal public enforcement and result
in a still lower social cost.
The existence of a public monopoly of enforcementin a particular
area of the law is a necessary rather than a sufficientcondition of
discretionary nonenforcement. A publicagency could in principle enforce
all of the laws entrusted to its administration.But in practice it
cannot, given the budget constraint mentioned earlier.Nothing so far said,
however, determines the principle by which thepublic agency will select
its cases. Conceivably it could concentrate itsresources on precisely
those areas of conduct that had been broughtinadvertently within the scope
of the statutory prohibition. But thisseems unlikely. Capricious public
enforcement is not unknown (or even rare) buton what little evidence we
have does not appear to be the centraltendency of public enforcement.
Among other reasons, the annual appropriationshearing affords the legislature
an opportunity to assure that theagency has not strayed too far from the
intended, as distinct from the enacted, legislativeregulations that the
agency is enforcing. There is no corresponding check in privateenforcement.41.
An alternative to discretionary nonenforcement is to permit unlimited
private enforcement but rewrite the substantive rules of law to eliminate
overinclusion. This alternative involves costs of two sorts: the
cost of drafting a more precise rule, and the cost of failing to prevent
the socially undesirable conduct that would be rendered legally permissible
by the loopholes that a more precise rule would inevitably create. These
costs are reciprocal: the loophole effect can be diminished by more care-
ful drafting, but the additional care is costly. The costs of rewriting
rules to make them more precise without creating serious loopholes might
exceed the costs of discretionary enforcement.
The legislature may not have to rewrite the law. The courts may refuse
to enforce foolish or perverse applications of a statute. There are precedents
for judicial refusal to enforce the law, and jury nullification of unpopular
laws is an old story. Alternatively, an administrative agency with
broad interpretive powers could be interposed between the legislature and
the private enforcer, and enforcement permitted only after the agency had
issued an interpretation of the relevant statute. However, to give judges,
juries, or administrative agencies the power to narrow the application of
law is simply to shift discretionary nonenforcement from public enforcement
agenciesto other official bodies. And if giving courts a discretionary
powerto decline to enforce the law is tolerable, then the major cost of
discretionary nonenforcement by public enforcement agencies can be eliminated
without abrogating the public monopoly of enforcement.
We anticipate the objection that our analysis ignores the effect of
requiring the private enforcer who fails to prove his case against the
allegedviolator to compensate the latter for the costs of his defense.42.
But compensation is immaterial to our argument. Ifa statute inadvertently
forbids practice X, requiring a losing enforcer tocompensate the alleged
violator may deter the enforcer from proceedingagainst someone who has
committed a practice that is not clearly X, but it will not deterhim from
proceeding against someone who is clearly guilty of X, merely because X
was not really intended to be forbidden. Private enforcers of antitrust
laws bring some suits that would not be brought bypublic agencies because
the suits are unrelated or even contrary to the fundamentalpurpose of the
antitrust laws, although consistent with thevague language of the antitrust
statutes and the careless language in many judicial opinions in antitrust
cases; and often these enforcers succeed in obtaining largejudgments
or generous settlements. They would not be deterred by being forced to
reimburse winning defendants' legal and otherexpenses.
A major cost of discretionary nonenforcement arises from itsconverse,
which is selective or discriminatory enforcement. Recent disclosures ofthe
inner workings of the federal government indicate that the tax lawsare
sometimes enforced more harshly against opponents thansupporters of the
political party in power, and these examples must be much more common than
we know. There are also cases where the law is enforced against all butone
competing firm, giving that firm an undeserved (and inefficient) advantage
over its competitors. This oppressive and inefficient feature of public
law enforcement would be eliminated under a regime ofprivate enforcement.
The law would be enforced against everyone who violated it andenforcement
would not place a particular firm or individual at an unfairdisadvantage.
Although the danger of discriminatory enforcement is a seriousone,
it is somewhat mitigated by judicial doctrines that limitdiscretionary43.
enforcement, and in the criminal area by the power of the jury to
acquit a defendant for reasons sufficient unto itself. It has been
urged that the doctrines limiting discriminatory enforcement be expanded,
and this might be a good idea, although its implementation would not be
costless. The effectiveness of these doctrines would be enhanced by
requiring the losing party in a lawsuit to reimburse the winner's legal
expenses--this would at least eliminate that form of harrassment that con-
sists of forcing someone to bear the costs of defending against a groundless
lawsuit.
E. Blackmail and Bribery
Blackmail may be defined as the sale of information to an individual
who would be incriminated by its publication, and at first glance appears
to be an efficient method of private enforcement of the law (the moral as
I wellas the positive law). The value of the information to the blackmailed
individual is equal to the cost of the punishment that the individual will
incur if the information is communicated to the authorities and he is pun-
ished as a result, and so he will be willing to pay up to that amount
to the blackmailer for the information. The individual is thereby punished,
and the punishment is the same as if he had been apprehended and convicted
for the crime that the blackmailer has discovered, but the fine is paid to
the blackmailer rather than to the state.
Why then is blackmail a crime? A superficial answer is that it
resultsinunderdeterrence of crimes punished by nonpecuniary sanctions
becausethe criminals lack the resources to pay an optimal fine. The black-
mailer will sell his information to the criminal for a price lower than
the cost of punishment if the criminal cannot pay a higher price. This44.
problem, however, could be solved by a system of public bountiesequal
to the cost of punishment (or lower, to induce the enforcementindustry
to contract to optimal size). Then the blackmailer couldalways claim
a bounty from the state if the criminal was unable topay a price equal
to the optimal fine.
A more persuasive explanation of why blackmail is a crime is that
the decision to discourage blackmail follows directly from the decision
to rely on a public monopoly of law enforcement in some areas of enforce-
ment, notably criminal law. Were blackmail, a form of private enforcement,
lawful, the public monopoly of enforcement would be undermined. Overenforce-
ment of the law would result if the blackmailer were able to extract the full
fine from the offenders (say f* in Figure 5). Alternatively, the blackmailer
might sell his incriminating information to the offender for a price lower
than the statutory cost of punishment to the criminal, which would reduce
the effective cost of punishment to the criminal below the level setby the
legislature. --"
Consistentlywith this analysis, we observe that practices indistin-
guishable from blackmail, though not called by that name, are permitted in
areas where the law is enforced privately rather than publicly because the
overenforcement problem is not serious. No one seems to object to a person's
collecting information about his or her spouse's adulterous activities,
and threatening to disclose that information in a divorceproceeding or
other forum, in order to extract maximum compensation for theoffending
spouse's breach of the marital obligations. A third party is not permitted
to "blackmail" the offending spouse (unless the third party is the victimized
spouse's agent) because permitting him to enforce the marital contract would
.45.
undermine the assignment of the exclusive right to enforce such contracts
to the victim of the breach. It is also consistent with our anlaysis that
blackmail is forbidden in areas where there are no legal prohibitions at all--
where the information would humiliate, but not incriminate, the blackmailer's
victim. The social decision not to regulate a particular activity is a
judgment that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover and
punish it would be socially wasted. That judgment is undermined if black-
mailers are encouraged to expend substantial resources on attempting to
apprehend and punish people engaged in the activity.
Blackmail and bribery appear to be virtually identical practices from
the standpoint of the analysis of private enforcement. The blackmailer
and the bribed official both receive payment in exchange for not enforcing
the law. We therefore predict that in areas where there is a public mono-
poly of enforcement, bribery, like blackmail, will be prohibited, while
in areas where there is no public monopoly it will be permitted. And so
we observe. The settlement out of court of a tort or contract or private
antitrust case is a form of perfectly lawful bribery, although the term
is not used in these situations (except by economists) because of its
pejorative connotation.
An interesting example of "bribery" occurs in connection with the
class action. As mentioned earlier, concern is frequently expressed that
the lawyer for the class will be tempted to "sell out" the class by negotia-
ting with the defendant's lawyer a settlement that will involve a combination
of nominal relief in favor of the class with a large legal fee for its
lawyer; the individual class member's stake in the outcome of the action
is too small to warrant his exercising effective control over the lawyer46.
for the class. This problem wouldnot arise if the lawyer for the class
were permitted to retain the entire proceeds ofthe class action; then
his interest would be identical withthat of the class. Such a solution,
which is advocated by Becker andStigler, is simply a specific application
of the principle of pure privateenforcement, where the entire penalty
imposed on the offender is received by theenforcer as compensation. Under
existing law, the lawyer for the class is notentitled to receive the entire
damages awarded to the class. He is entitledonly to a reasonable attorney's
fee, which is fixed by the court,ordinarily as a small fraction of the
total damages. The difference betweenthe total damages awarded and the
attorney's fee is the equivalent of the enforcementtax that we have dis-
cussed as a device for reducing the scaleof private enforcement. Like the
tax, it drives a wedge between what the offenderpays and what the enforcer
receives, and thereby creates opportunities fora form of bribery, very
difficult to prevent, that consists of theoffender's agreeing to a settle-
ment that involves a higher attorney's feefor the enforcer, but a lower
damages bill, than the court would award. In thisfashion both parties
to the class action can be made betteroff--viewing the lawyer for the
class as the real party in intereston the plaintiff's side of the action.
.APPENDIX
Hiring Private EnfOrcers by Offering Rewards
A comon method by which the victim of a crime or other unlawful
activity hires private enforcement is by offering a return for the loss
of stolen property. Rewards are an interesting counterpart to the
analysis of private enforcement in Part I. There the "reward"—— in effect,
thefine—-was a coerced transfer set by the state whereas the typical
reward is a voluntary payment determined by a private individual or firm.
To simplify the analysis of rewards we provisionally assume that rewards
have no impact on the volume of stolen or lost property. --''Rewards(B)
will, however, tend to increase the probability (p) that the property is
returned to the owner, as in
p=p(B) (17)
where p' =Dp/aB>0.Let V denote the value of the property to the
original owner while kV (k <1)denotes the value to the finder or thief.
In the case of (unmarked) currency, k will approach unity. In the case of
goods with high sentimental value or low marketability, for example pets
and kidnap victims, k will be close to zero. A reward will be ineffectual
when it is less than k •V.Thus
p'=O;B<kV (18)
and
p' >0; B>kV. (19)
The offeror of the reward will seek to maximize
ii=p(V-B) (20)
with respect to B, which yields
B =V/(l+
h-), (21)A- 2.
providing p' >0and where c =p'(B/p).---"(Obviouslywhen p' =0, S
no reward is offered.) B will be a positive functionof both V and the
elasticity of response to changes in B. Further, thesmaller k is, the
more likely is it that B will exceed kV and thata reward will be offered.
The legal rules governing rewardsare given by the branch of the law
of contracts dealing with so—called unilateralcontracts. For example,
suppose A posts a reward for information leading to thearrest of X and
the recovery of A's property stolen by X.If C, having learned of the
reward, complies with the conditions set by A, he hasa legal right to
claim the reward-—to enforce, in otherwords, A's "unilateral contract".
But suppose C finds X and returns A'sproperty to him without having
known of the reward. In this instance C hasno legal claim to the reward.
It is interesting to examine what effect thisrule has on p and B compared
toan alternative that compels the payment of the rewardwithout inquiring
intowhether or not C had knowledge of its existence.In the latter instance,
the incentives of some enforcers to invest timeand effort in learning about
and following through on reward offers will bereduced if they know that
the casual finder is now more likely to returnlost or stolen property
knowing that if there is a reward he is entitled to claim itthough he was
unaware of its existence. Granting legal rights to the "casual"enforcer,
therefore, reduces E,the elasticity of response ofpto a change in B, by
its discouraging effect on the more seriousenforcers.
The result of the right will be to induce theposting of lower rewards (see
(21)).Itdoes not follow, however, tat the levelor amount of enforce-
ment will fall: the increased incentive of the casualenforcer may more
than offset the reduced incentive to the seriousenforcer and hence p will rise.Footnotes
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1. See references in Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
pt. VI (1973).
2. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
Leg. Studies 1 (1974).
3. They would provide a perfect parallel to private enforcement if
violators of law were assumed to be nondeterrable--a belief common
in certain criminological circles.
I2.
4. See 2 Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and
Its Administration from 1750 (1957); Margaret Gay Davies, The
Enforcement of English Apprenticeship, A Study in Applied Mercan—
tilism, 1563-1642 (1956). Although there were some public police,
they were paid only nominal salaries by the state, and looked to
bounties, fines, and the like as their principal compensation--in
effect they were licensed private enforcers.
The history of private criminal-law enforcement in the United
States has not, to our knowledge, been studied extensively. Evidently,
there was some borrowing from the English model. For example, the
Refuse Act of 1899 provides that one-half of the fine for a violation
of the Act is to be paid "to the person or persons giving information
which shall lead to conviction." 33 U.S.C411 (1970). However,
thestatute has recently been construed as placing the exclusive
authority to bringenforcement actions in the Department of Justice.
SeeBass Angler Sportsman Society v.United States Steel Corp., 324
F. Supp. 412(D. Ala. 1971), aff'd subnom. Bass Angler Sportsman
Societyv. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971).
5. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1973), for a
discussion of the positive economic theory of law and references
to supporting studies. Cf. The Economics of Crime and Punishment
(Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds. 1974).
6. We ask the nonmathematical reader not to be deterred by the formal
developmentof the model in Part I,and by the occasional references
to the formal model thereafter. We provide a3.
6 continued
verbal explanation of the principal features of the model and the
findings based on it.
7. A more complicated model would consider apprehensions and convictions
separately, and thus allow, for example, for enforcement by harrass-
ment (arresting and/or prosecuting but not convicting an offender).
8. The model does not distinguish between offenders and offenses:
each offender is assumed to commit a single offense. The number
of offenses is included in the industry's production function for
the following reason. To produce an apprehension and conviction,
a criminal offense will generally have to occur and hence an offender
will have to exist (the special case of the fabricated offense is
treated in Part II E infra). As the number of offenders increases,
both the resources expended in searching out an offender and the
waiting time between offenses will typically decline and hence the
number of apprehensions and convictions will increase for a given
input of hired resources. An appropriate analogy is to an industry
consisting of firms fishing on a lake, where a given output of fishing
resources will yield a greater catch, the greater the number of fish
in the lake.
9. We make one assumption not explicit in the Becker—Stigler analysis:
that the offender is not entitled to turn himself in and receive the
fine. The importance of this assumption is discussed in Part II B
I _____4.
10. Defining A1/0, (1) can be rewritten as A =OA(R/0,1)=Op,where RIO =p.
Since the marginal product of R, which equals O(p/(R/O))
=p/(R/O),is assumed to be positive, p is a positive
function of R/O.
11.See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in
Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
81 J. Pol. Econ. 521 (1973), and The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law
Enforcement, 1 J. Leg. Studies 259 (1972).
12.The similarity of this analysis to that of a free-accessresource
should be apparent. See F. H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Inter-
pretation of Social Cost, reprinted in Readings in Price Theory
(George J. Stigler & Kenneth E. Boulding eds. 1952); see also
Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of
a Non—Exclusive Resource, 13 J. Law & Econ. 49 (1970); J. R. Gould,
Externalities, Factor Proportions and the Level of Exploitation of
Free Access Resources, Economica (1972). In Knight's example
of the well-graded but narrow road, trucks entering the road ignore
the added congestion costs imposed on other trucks.In the enforce-
ment case, firms entering the industry or expanding ignore the
resulting reduction in the number of offenders available to other
firms. Both cases are examples of external technical diseconomies
and lead to upward shifts in the marginal cost curves of firms.
.5.
12. continued
Competitive enforcement might also generate external economies.
Suppose enforcer X apprehends an offender who has comitted addi-
tional offenses not known to Xbutknown to enforcers V and Z.
X'sactivity will have lowered the costs to V and Z of apprehending
andconvicting the offender. This source of external economies is
eliminated in our analysis by the assumption that each offender
commitsa single offense. If this assumption were dropped, our
analysis would have to assume that the external diseconomies were
greater on balance than any external economies.
13.Equilibrium also requires that each firm maximize profits. Thus
marginal cost must equal f for the firm while average cost
(r/(O/R)p) must equal f for the industry. These requirements can
be reconciled as follows. Assume the firm's production function
with respect to 0 and R is homogeneous of degree one at its equili-
brium output. (This would be true even if the firm's cost function
were rising or U-shaped, because competition would force the firm
to operate in the constant part of its average cost curve.) Since
the firm by assumption acts as if 0 were freely available at a zero
price, it would utilize offenders until their marginal product, as
calculated by the firm, were zero. That is, the ith firm would employ
0 until =
p—p(R/O)
=0,which implies p(O/R) =p.
In
other words, the firm acts as if the marginal product of R is equal
to the average product of R. Hence each firm would view the industry's
average product of R in equilibrium as identical to the firm's marginal
product, or industry average cost as equal to the firm's marginal cost.6.
13 continued
Of course, the industry's marginal product of R is below its
(private)
average product, and therefore the firm's/marginal product exceeds
(social)
the industry's/marginal product.
14.The average product of R equals (O/R)p and
P) =-(O/R)2(p-(R/O)p')<0
where p' =p/(R/O).Since p-(R/O)p' is the marginal product of 0,
which is assumed positive for the industry, ((O/R)p)/(R/O) is
negative. Observe that p' >0since p' is the marginal product of
R. Hence p is a positive function of the R/O ratio while the average
product of R is a negative function of this ratio.
S 15.Since p remains equal top0, the equilibrium increase in offenses
is the original exogenous increase of 20 per cent.
16. No social purpose would be served by these devices in our model
since by assumption no innocent persons are convicted.
17.This occurs because with A constant at A0, p will rise above
p0.
Hence there will be a movement up the offense function as well as
a shift of the function to the left.
.7.
18 The total differential of the equilibrium conditions inequation
(5) with respect to p and f yields
0 =df+(r(R/O)- ) dp (i)
where p1 =p/a(R/O)=A/R>0.(i) can be rewritten as
pp1 >0 (••) df
—
r(p-p'(R/O)) 11
where(p—p'(R/O)) =A/0>0(from the assumption that the
marginal product of 0 for the industry is positive).
19.See Gary S. Becker, supra note 11. Total enforcementcosts have
previouslybeen defined as rR. Since R can be written as a
function of 0 and p, total enforcement costscan be written as a
functionof p and 0. Thus rR =rR(0,p)=C(0,p).
20. For a formal analysis of this point see Michael K. Block &Robert
C. Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered, 4 J.Leg. Studies
(1975). Block and Lind also discuss the conditions underwhich
imprisonment beyond some point produces no marginal deterrence.
21. If D <0at this point, the optimum p would be arbitrarily close
tozero and the optimum number of apprehensions and convictions
would also be approximately zero. Theassumption that D > 0is
taken from Gary S. Becker, supra note 11, at 173.
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22.Suppose f were less than f* and p was finite. Areduction in
p matched by an appropriate increase in f would thenproduce the
same deterrent effect--the same number of offenses--ata lower
social loss since C would be reduced.Hence f would be raised
until it reached f*
23. If the optimal level of offenseswere zero, there would be no purpose
in analyzing enforcement orcomparing private and public enforce-
ment because there would be no offenders toapprehend and no
enforcement activity; there would only besome stand—by enforcement
capacity to keep p from falling all theway to zero.
24. In the case of competitive privateenforcement, form the Lagrangian L*:
L* =L÷ X[f—r/(O/R)p].
(i)










We assume that the second-order conditionsare satisfired for a local
minimum.
25. See the derivation of dp/df in note 18,supra.
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26. We have




since dL =0.The explicit derivation of L/f and L/p must
take account of the assumption that the enforcement production
function involves constant returns to scale. Since C(0,p) =rR,
=
D'Of
+ r -g-0 (iii)
=
D'0
+ r - (iv)





R/p in (iv) is more complicated to evaluate where
i(1R 0 P)= P' Rp 0
o2pR
O(l.c)
It can be shown that 0 <(=p'(R/O),Ip < 1 since
=p-p'(R/O) =p(l—)> 0.




We assume that enforcement costs rise as p increases (i.e., CIp =
rRIp> 0 in (iv)). This requires that the product be less
than unity. Since 0 < < 1, will necessarily be less than
unity if < 1.
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27.As the point where 3L/p =0(given f), we assume that the second—
order conditions for a local minimumare satisfied, i.e.,






_D'c <0and J- (l_e) >0since 0 < < 1and 0 < < 1.
We take as an approximation that andare constant. (For example,
in the Cobb-Douglas function A =kRaO pequals k(R/0)c and
(=log p/alog (RIO) equals the constant ct.) Hence
=rr'oc+(l-)[l-2]
>0 (ii)
whenever Dt >0.Note p" <0follows from the earlier assumption
of diminishing marginal product of R whereD2A/02p"(l/O) <0.





providedthat D" >0and L/p2 >0.





Since O <0and (r/Pl)O(l_E) >0(from the assumption that the
marginal cost of increasing p is positive), D' must bepositive for
(i) to equal zero. An increase in f will reduce0 which in turn will
reduce both the amount of damages (since D'>0)and the costs of
to maintain a constant p)




29.As p continues to increase along a given SLIC, the number of
offenses may be reduced to the point where marginal net damages
are negative (i.e., where the net gain to the offenders after
deducting the direct costs of committing the offense exceeds the
added harm from the offense). Hence, increases in f at this point--
working through reducing 0--may raise the social loss, and the SLIC
will then fall forward, having a negative slope. This part of the
indifference curve, however, is irrelevant (as will become more
apparent below) when the social loss is minimized under either private
or public enforcement.
30. In Figure 3 we assume not only that an optimum point exists but that
it is unique. There are other possibilities. For example, it is
likely that PR1 will increase at a decreasing rate and asymptotically
within some
approach a limit (< 1). Thus, I range, the slope of PR1 (=dp/df)
may decrease at the same rate as -(L/f)/(L/p) so that a range of
values for p and f will satisfy the optimality condition. Second,
dp/df may always be less than -(aL/Df)/(L/p) when the latter is
positive and the optimal p will then be at a "corner"--i.e., at a
point where the fine equals f*
31. If the fine were set at f*__the value of f that minimizes the un-
constrained social loss function-—instead of f1, both the difference
in social loss and the amount of excess enforcement would be even
greater under privatethan public enforcement. Since the




f1,the Social loss must be greater at f* along thePR1 curve.
In contrast, the social loss at f* is less than atf1 along the
=0curve. Hence the difference in social loss between private
and public enforcement must be greater at f* than atf1. The
difference in probabilities is obviously greater at f* thanf1 since
PR1 is positively sloped and aL/ap =0is negatively sloped.
32. Thisoverenforcement theorem may not hold if the optimal fine under
private enforcement is the corner solution f* It is conceivable that
f* may be sufficiently small relative to enforcement costs so that the
positively sloped PR1 curve is below the L/p =0curve at f*• Of
course, if f* were sufficiently large relative to enforcement costs,
the overenforcement theorem would still hold at the corner. We
disregard these possibilities in the subsequent analysis.
33.This explanation should make clear that the overenforcement theorem
does not depend on our assumptions that the enforcement industry is
competitive and that rights to offenders are acquired strictly on
a first-come first-served basis. That is, it does not depend on the
analogy between enforcement and the exploitation of a free-access
resources. This is shown rigorously in Part II B infra.
34.This result does not require a single monopoly of all enforcement
activity in the society. Monopolies of particular types of offenses
or in particular areas, are all that is necessary in order to inter-
nalize the responses of offenders to enforcement activity, assuming
separate markets within the law-enforcement industry.13.
35. We assume that
c1,
the elasticity of the supply of offenses with
respect to a change in p, is less than unity. Otherwise, reductions
in R (and hence p) would always raise profits since A (=Op) would
rise >1)or remain constant (e., =1)and costs would fall (as
R fell ).Profitswould then be maximized by setting R (and p)
at infinitesimally small values. Moreover, if >1this would
result in an arbitrarily large number of both offenders and appre-
hensions.
Thefirst-order condition for profit maximization is
=fO-+fO--r=O (i)
and
=(1_R o (ii dR p U2 pdR
= p'/O(l + 2'O) (iii)
= p'/O(l — (iv)
Substituting(iv) into (i)and rearranging terms yields
dli— r — --
p'(l- - - 0
=f— (vi)
hasbeen assumed <1,and it has previously been shown that is
also less than unity (see note _____
(.. Therefore,w is lessthan unity since 0 <c.,
<1.
If we assume as a first approximation that and are constant, then
the second—order condition for a maximum is simply that Bp'/R <0,/thatmar-
ginal cost be rising. p'/R must be negative by the assumption that the
marginal product of R is diminishing.14.
36 Although r/p'w internalizes theresponse of offenders to an
increase in A via the inclusion of in w, there is still
only one possible equilibrium point along thiscurve. An
increase in f will reduce the number of
offenses, lowering p'
and shifting the marginal costcurve to the left.
37.At A0 the difference betweenmarginal cost and average cost equals




Since p —(R/O)p'=3R/O>0,and 0 <w<1,d is positive.
38,.The proof that <cat f0 (where the subscripts m andc denote
monopoly and competition respectively) is as follows.The equili-
brium conditions (5) and (11) in thetext imply that
P'mW =Pc(huI1)c (i)
Multiplying the right—hand side of (i) by'c''c yields
PmU3 ='c"c (ii)
where 0 <w, <1.Therefore, (ii) holds only if >
Andsince p' is a negative function of RIO(from the assumption
that p" <0or that both R and 0 have diminishingmarginal products),
> only if the RIO ratio is smaller undermonopoly than





Minimizing L* with respect to f and p, and assuming as an






We assume that the second—order conditions are satisfied for a
local minimum.




dPc/df = pp'/r(l —) (ii)
Assuming as an approximation that $, and w are all constants yields
A/aO =p(l—) > 0 (iii)
-p'(R/O2Xl -) < 0 (iv)
Since B2A/O2 also equals p"(R2/03), we have
—p'(O/R)(l —) p" (v)
Substituting (11) and (v) into (i) (and ignoring the approximation
sign) and multiplying by m'm yields
dp/df = —) (i-a)
Substituting (5) into (ii) and multiplying by c'c yields
dPc/df =p/f(l
-) (li-a)
Since at the same fine <
dP/df<dp/df. (vi)16.
.
41.This assumes that the price of the output of the free-access
resourceis independent of the level of output in the relevant
range.




and the fee per apprehension (t) would equal
t =f0
—r/(O/R)p. (ii)
Thus t is equal to the difference between f and the average cost
of a unit of A. Maximizing T with respect to apprehensions and







Noting that p -p'=p(1-) andmaking use of the derivation




That is, total fees are maximized at a given fine by charging a
price per apprehension equal to the difference between marginal
and average cost. Note that the average cost curve in Figure 4 is
not the relevant average cost curve at A0* because the number of
offenders at A0* will be larger than at A0.17.
43.A system of de facto victim rights might emerge from a first-come
first-served system if enforcers could not prosecute offenders
successfully without the victim's cooperation (in signing a complaint,
testifying, etc.).
44. If were equal to zero (i.e., offenses were unresponsive to changes
in p), then victim enforcement would be identical to enforcement under
a system of state-assigned property rights. Note that when =0,
the latter assignment still yields a lower level of apprehensions than
thefirst-come first-served system because marginal cost exceeds
averagecost (rip'> r/p(0/R)) at a given output in Figure 4.
45.Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, supra note 2, at 16, recognize
excessiveprivate
theproblem of / enforcement and suggesta tax asa way of
overcoming it.
46.See id. at 14.
47. Even the fact that contracts of bribery are not legally enforceable
presumably discourages bribery to some extent. The offender has no
legal protection against the enforcer's trying to extract a second




However, an enforcer who acquired a reputation for double dealing
would have difficulty extracting bribes in the future from otherpeople.
48. But it is not clear that it can be. See B. PeterPashigian, On the
Control of Crime and Bribery (U. Chi. Grad. Sch. Bus., Sept. 1974).
The size of the tax necessary to bring about the optimum level of
enforcement would presumably be an important variable determining the
costs of preventing bribery.
49. Lacking as we do the imagination of the Tudors:
Under it [the statute 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547)], a city, town
or village which tolerated vagrants and vagabonds might be
sued by anybody for a part of the penalty the rest of which
went to the Crown. A pauper convicted of 'SO living idle and
loiteringly' was to be branded with hot irons and given to
the informer [i.e., enforcer] as his slave for twoyears, to
be fed on bread and water and caused to do all such work, 'how
vile soever it bee, as hee shall put him unto', by 'beating,
cheining, or otherwise.'
2 Leon Radzinowicz, supra note 4, at 140. The statutewas repealed
after two years. Ibid.
50. Expenditures the only purpose and effect of which are to transfer
wealth have no social product where, as here, there is no ethical
or other socially approved reason for the transfer.
51. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. Leg. Studies 399, 412 (1973).
S19.
52.This is a familiar problem in an activity analogous to private
law enforcement: animal bounty—hunting. There have been cases
where, when bounties were offered for coyotes, or other pests,
some people would raise these animals for the bounty, or turn
in the ear of a dog for the bounty claiming that it was a coyote's
ear. See T. S. Palmer, Extermination of Noxious Animals by Bounties
in Yearbook of the U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 1896, at 55, 62-64
(1897).
53. This example raises the interesting question why preparatory
activities (attempts) are punished at all—-what is the social
harm of trying but failing to commit a crime? The conventional
explanation in the criminal law literature is that the attempt
I identifies the individual who commits itasa dangerous person
likelyto commit the completed crime in the future, and we punish
him to discourage or prevent him from doing so. This is not a
satisfactory economic explanation for the law of attempts. Under
a system of optimal penalties, the expected punishment cost to the
criminal--i.e., the price that he must pay to commit the crime--will
be exactly equal to its social cost, so ifhe chooses to commit the
crimeit will mean that the value of the criminal act exceeds its
cost. The commission of a crime when optimal penalties are in effect
is no more reprehensible than the purchase of an apple when theprice
of an apple is equal to the social cost of producing and selling
apples. The difference, which suggests an economic rationale for
I20.
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punishing (some) attempts, is that the social cost and hence
appropriate price of many criminal activities (murders, cartels,etc.)
are so difficult to determine that we try to prevent such activities
from occurring by intervening at thepreparatory stages, rather than
allowing the legal system's "market" in cimres to determine their
extent.
54.They are much stressed in the literature on the history of private
enforcement of the criminal laws in England. See 2 Leon Radzinowicz,
supra note 4. But no systematic evidence of the frequency of such
abuses appears to be available. One abuse that is mentioned in the
literature (see id. at 308) but omitted from our enumeration is
collusion between enforcer and offender: the enforcerpays someone
to commit a crime, apprehends and convicts him, and then divides
the bounty with the offender. This practice will occuronly when
the penalty is smaller than the reward, and normally (but notinvariably;
see p. infra) efficiency will require that it equal or exceed it.
We have already discussed, in Part II Bsupra, the special problem
of collusion between offender and enforcer thatcomes about because
the offender, if he can turn himself in for the reward,may thereby
escape the costs of punishment for his unlawful activity.
.21.
55.This need not be true if the defendant has limited resources
to finance his defense (see Richard A. Posner, supra note 51, at
417), but such an assumption seems out of place in the present
discussion, where complete reliance on a system on monetary penalties
is assumed.In any event, the problem can be eliminated, though not
costlessly, by the provision of counsel at the expense of the state
to the indigent accused.
56. The present rule against entrapment applies only to public enforce-
ment, but if criminal enforcement were privatized the rule could
readily be extended to cover private enforcers. Again, the question
arises why, under an optimum system of penalties, solicitations or
inducements to commit crimes should be treated differently from
ordinary selling efforts. The answer may be that entrapment normally
involves misrepresentation--the individual who is encouraged to commit
the crime does not know that he will not be permitted to retain its
fruits.
57.Victim rights appear not to be feasible in the case of uncompleted
crimes-—the victim will often be unaware that the attempt to commit
a crime against him has been made. This implies that the private
prosecution of attempts would remain an area where rights to legal
claims were acquired on a first-come first-served basis, even ifthe
generalrule was that such rights were owned by the victims of crime.
I22.
58.However, the empirical findings of a study in which publicprosecutors
were assumed to seek merely to maximize weighted convictionssuggest
that this assumption has considerable explanatorypower. See William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law &Econ. 61
(1971).
59.Probably a small fraction. See Richard A. Posner,supra note 51,
at 410-15.
60.When legal error is introduced, the p and f derived fromminimizing
the social loss function (with or without constraints) would differ
from their corresponding values in an errorless system, butwe
ignore these differences in our anál.ysis.
61.As p falls, the number of offenses rises. Hence ifc were greater
than unity, 0 would rise proportionately more thanp would fall and
the number of convictions of both innocent and guiltypersons would
rise. However, we have assumed throughout that is less than unity
(see note 35 supra).
62.This analysis obviously has implications, not explored in thisarticle,
for the appropriate role of the state in areas besides law enforcement.
It does not, however, impair the traditionalargument for public
provision of national defense, a type of law enforcement. Fines
paid to enforcers are not practicable in that context because there
is no institution to compel anaggressor to pay the victims of aggression
a fine.23.
63. See Richard A Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
(Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 55, Sept. 1974). The
costs of monopolizing could be reduced, even under the franchise
approach, if an auction system were substituted for the usual
methods of granting public franchises.
64.This is not universally true. In England and Western Europe, the
victim of a crime is frequently permitted to prosecute if the public
prosecutor declines to do so. See Bernard M. Dickens, Control of
Prosecutions in the United Kingdom, 22 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 1 (1973);
John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutional Discretion in Germany,
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439 (1974); Joachim Hermann, The Rule of Complusory
Prosecutionand the Scope of Prosecutional Discretion in Germany,
id. at 468. In several states in this country, private prosecution
of crimes is permitted if the public prosecutor consents. See Note,
Private Prosecution--The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 1171 (1972).
The practical significance of these islands of private prosecutionmay
be small, however. Since most criminals are judgment-proof, the
incentive of private individuals to prosecute for crime would ordinarily
require that a bounty be offered for successful prosecution, and it is
not. In the absence of a bounty or a solvent defendant,
private enforcement encounters serious free-rider problems. However, some
criminal actions are still brought privately in England, for example
by department stores against shoplifters, where the benefits to the
individual store of establishing a reputation for vigorous enforcement
are presumably great.
I24.
65. Sometimes the parties to contracts opt out of the public court
system by agreeing to arbitrate any issue arising under the con-
tract. Even there, the state is in the background: the party to
an arbitration proceeding can obtain a court order compelling com-
pliance with the award of the arbitrator.
66. Partly, to be sure, as a result of criminal and other regulatory
statutes involving licensing of drivers, registration of vehicles,
and punishment for leaving the scene of an accident.
67.See Gary S. Becker, supra note 11, at 192, for a proof of this result.
68. Although a bribe is a transfer payment rather than a cost,
the opportunity to obtain bribes will attract resources into efforts
to obtain the opportunity until, at the margin, cost and gain are
equated.
69.Bribery of enforcers, if the bounty is set below the cost of punish-
ment to prevent overenforcement; collusion between enforcers and
offenders if it is set above cost.
70.A possible counterexample should be noted here. Price fixing is a
concealable activity, and consistently with our analysis is punished
as a crime. But private prosecution, in the form of treble-damage




widely assumed that the threat of these actions is the most
effective deterrent to price fixing; the reason seems to be that
the maximum criminal penalty for price fixing (one year in prison
and a $50,000 fine) is far below both the optimal level and the
penalty meted out in private actions (thrice the overcharge), which
is also, in all probability, suboptirnal. If f in both public and
privateactions were, say 100 times the overcharge, the appropriate-
ness of allowing private actions would have to be reexamined.
71.See generally Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. Leg. Studies (1975).
72. We have in mind the provision in the tetracycline class-action
settlement whereby proceeds unclaimed by the victims of the conspiracy
were allowed to escheat to the states in which those victims resided.
See State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir. 1971).
73. Cf. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory concerning Patents for
Invention, 1 Economica (n.s.) 30 (1934).
74.The requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, administered
by the Patent Office, and by the courts in patent-infringement actions,
are the means by which the patent laws deal with the second problem
p26.
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discussed above. The first is dealt with by, for example, the
rule that disclosure of an invention is protected if the inventor
files for a patent within a year following disclosure. Foran
analogy from the history of private enforcement in England see
2 Leon Radzinowicz, yp-anote4, at 138-39, n.2.
75. Commonly today after a class action is filed other lawyers attempt
to jump on the bandwagon by appearing as representatives of other
members of the class, subclasses, related classes, etc.When it
comes time to award attorneys' fees the judge has to evaluate the
various attorneys' contributions. The presence of multiple attorneys
is not entirely a bad thing since the competitionamong them may
reduce the problem of the class attorney who "sells out" the class
by agreeing with the defendant on a settlement that involves a small
award of damages and a large award of attorney's fees.
76. This assumes that once C had sued and collected from A, B could not
also obtain damages from A and thereby subject A to double liability.
77.There would be, to be sure, a "moral hazard" problem if claims were
freely transferable. After the victim had sold his claim to the
enforcer, the latter might have difficulty enlisting the victim's
cooperation in testifying against the defendant, etc. This would not
appear, however, to be a more serious problem than similar problems
often encountered in contractual situations when payment precedes
performance.27.
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Free transferability of claims might be an efficient alternative
to the class action, but this would depend on the transaction costs
of using the market to aggregate a large number of very small
c 1 aims.
78. Cf. the statistics on agency budgets in George J. Stigler, The Process
of Economic Regulation, 17 Antitrust Bull. 207 (1972); Richard A.
Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. Leg. Studies
305, 320 (1972).
79. In fiscal year 1973, the IRS audited fewer than twoper cent of the
total federal tax returns filed, and found additional tax due,amounting
in the aggregate to more than $4 billion, in more than two-thirds of
the returns audited. 1973 Internal Revenue Service Ann. Rep.v, 25,
33. The total cost of its audits, however, was less than $450
million (id. at 145), which means that, onaverage, one dollar spent
on auditing yielded nine dollars in additional tax revenues. It is
possible that although average revenue for the Service was nine times
average cost, marginal revenue and marginal cost were equal. However,
given the small percentage of returns audited, the high percentage
of those audited that result in the assessment of additional taxdue,
and the extremely low ratio of cost to revenue for those returns that
are audited, it seem highly unlikely that no further expansion of
audit activity could be cost justified.28.
80.This would, however, give enforcers an incentive to bribe tax-
payers to violate the law. See note 54 ypra.
81. See., e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication:
A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. Leg. Studies
349 (1972).
82.This observation is not limited to public rules. "Working to rule"
is a familiar method by which employees disrupt their employers'
operations in order to obtain higher wages or better working condi-
tions without striking.
83.This analysis is developed in Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Leg. Studies 257 (1974).
84.Cf. Richard A. Posner, supra note 78, at 305-23.
85.Becker and Stigler suggest that the efforts of private enforcers to
enforce the laws as they are written would lead to irresistiblepres-
sure to redraft the laws so as to eliminate those prohibitions that
are not enforced by public agencies today because the forbidden conduct
is innocuous or beneficial (supra note 2, at 15). But this might
happen only because the cost of reformulating the law to eliminate
overinclusion was less than the cost of enforcing the law in its
existing form to the hilt, and the lesser of these two costs might
still be greater than the cost of discretionary nonenforcement,29.
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especially since the costs of legislative enactment are probably
quite high. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,supra note
83, at 267-68. Incidentally, the lcw repute in which informers
have long been held appears to be related to their role in the
enforcement of unpopular laws which a politically responsive enforcer
might ignore. See 2 Leon Radzinowicz, supra note 4, at 147-48.
86.See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right toSay No,
45 So. Calif. L. Rev. 162 (1972).
87.See Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States: "Neither
a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be", 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (Philip B. Kurland
ed.).
88.A notable though rather neglected precedent is InternationalBusiness
Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
89.See, e.g., Kenneth Cuip Davis, Discretionary Justice--APreliminary
Inquiry (1969) and An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52
Tex. L. Rev. 703, 714 (1974).
90. It would interfere with the executive function ofestablishing and
implementing enforcement priorities designed to maximize the agency's
effectiveness within its budget constraint.30.
91.Actually less, for reasons stated earlier (at p. )but
immaterial to the present analysis.
92.Overenforcement would still result if the blackmail price exceeded
the fine that would induce the same p with private enforcement
as would be obtained with public enforcement at f* in Figure 5.
93.Of course, rewards are also offered for lost property, and our
analysis is applicable to those cases although they are not
examples of law enforcement as it is usually defined.
94.The impact is unclear. Rewards may induce an increase in offenses
since the reward provides a ready market. Witness, for example,
the return of stolen art to insurance companies and ultimately the
owner. Ransom in kidnapping provides another example. On the other
hand, the prospects of rewards to persons other than the thief may
reduce the gains from and hence deter theft.
95. k may also incorporate factors such as the nonpecuniary benefits
of honesty. Presumably, the greater the degree of honesty, the lower k.
96.The second-order condition for a maximum is that p" (=92p/2B2) <0.
97,The social function of rewards is to transfer goods from lower-valued
(the thief or finder) to higher valued uses (the original owner). An
.31.
97 continued
interesting and difficult question is whether rewards provide a
net social benefit.In the case of a casual finder of lost goods,
rewards would appear to enhance values. The costs of finding the
good to the casual finder are approximately zero, and hence the net
expected gain to both parties is positive, as in
Z =p[(V-B)+(B-ky)]>0. (i)
On the other hand, if the finder is an enforcer who spends real
resources in the process, there is no presumption that rewards will
produce a social benefit, since now
z -C0 (ii)
where C is the enforcer'scosts. Observe that if the enforcer's
victims
cost equal pB, the maximumI would be willing to spend, then
(ii) becomes
p[V(l—k)—B] 0 (iii)
which is more likely to be positive the smaller k. The problem
is more difficult when we deal with theft because
whether rewards increase value depends critically on the response
of thieves to the prospects of rewards. For example, even if k were
zero-—the case of kidnapping--the elimination of rewards might reduce
the value of these offenses to zero.
98. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Eagle Pencil Co., 285 N.Y. 448, 35 N.E.2d 35
(1941); Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248 (1868); G. C. Cheshire &
C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law of Contract 45-46 (7th ed. 1969). A minority32.
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of courts hold the contrary view. See,e.g., Sullivan v. Phillips,
178 md. 164, 98 N.E. 868 (1912).
99.An offeror of a reward has no incentive to takeaccount of the
increase in incentives of casual enforcers because,by assumption,
the casual enforcer is unaware of whether a particularowner has
offered a reward. Hence, the effect of expanding thelegal rights
to rewards would be to reduce the owner's estimate ofc.
S
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